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Interest Rate Targets
Abandoned
In March 2001, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) announced
that it would no longer target the uncollateralized
overnight call rate, which is similar to the U.S. federal
funds rate.  Instead, the BOJ now targets the outstand-
ing balance of current accounts at the BOJ, which is
similar to the reserve component of the U.S. monetary
base, and has stated a goal of increasing current account
balances by 25 percent (from 4 to 5 trillion yen) over
the next six months.
Because the overnight call loan rate was approxi-
mately 0.15 percent when the BOJ announced its
change in policy, many commentators already viewed
Japan’s monetary policy as exceptionally easy.  Many
argued that low interest rates left the BOJ with little
room to ease further.  Such statements, however, fail
to recognize that monetary conditions are not neces-
sarily easy when nominal interest rates are low—even
exceptionally low.
Economists have long recognized that the level of
nominal interest rates can be a misleading indicator of
the stance of monetary policy.  Inflation expectations
and the growth of real economic activity influence the
level of interest rates.  If expected inflation declines or
economic activity slows, nominal interest rates tend to
fall unless the central bank attempts to offset these
forces.  If the central bank desires to maintain the cur-
rent level of its overnight interest rate target, it must
drain reserves from the banking system, which could
result in a slowing of monetary growth.
Central banks usually lower their interest rate target
when economic weakness or disinflation put downward
pressure on interest rates.  But, unless the central bank
lowers its target sufficiently, the growth of bank
reserves and the money stock could decline.  In such
circumstances, the behavior of interest rates and the
growth of monetary aggregates can give conflicting
signals.  The reduction of the target rate suggests that
policy has eased, whereas a slowing of the growth of
reserves or the money stock suggests that policy has
tightened.  This conflict is often most apparent during
periods of extreme economic distress.
Confusion over the meaning of low nominal
overnight interest rates in Japan today is similar to con-
fusion over the meaning of high nominal interest rates
in the United States during the 1970s.  During most of
the decade, the Fed implemented monetary policy by
targeting the federal funds rate.  As inflation accelerated
and market interest rates rose, the Fed followed suit by
raising its federal funds rate target.  For example, from
early January 1978 to September 1979 the Fed raised its
target for the federal funds rate by 5 percentage points
from 6.5 percent to 11.5 percent.  Many commentators
interpreted these actions as a substantial tightening of
monetary policy.  Despite sharply higher interest rates,
however, the growth rate of monetary aggregates and
the inflation rate increased.  By monetary growth mea-
sures, monetary policy was becoming easier, not tighter.
The Federal Reserve eventually recognized that it 
had not tightened enough to subdue inflation, and in
October 1979 the FOMC adopted new procedures
designed to bring inflation under control by slowing
monetary growth.
The case of Japan differs only in direction.  In an
economy with persistent deflation and negative output
growth, declining or low nominal interest rates do not
necessarily indicate easy monetary policy any more
than high nominal interest rates signal tight monetary
policy when output growth and inflation are rising.  
In adopting a monetary aggregate targeting procedure
with an explicit target for reserve growth, the BOJ is
signaling a willingness to pursue aggressive policies
to combat economic weakness regardless of the level
of the overnight nominal interest rate.
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